Health Serv Res by Karter, Andrew J. et al.
Impact of a pharmacy benefit change on new use of mail order 
pharmacy among diabetes patients: The Diabetes Study of 
Northern California (DISTANCE)
Andrew J. Karter, PhD1,
5875 Silver Willow Lane, Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
Melissa M. Parker, MS1,
2000 Broadway, Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Division of Research, Oakland, CA 
94612; tel: 510-891-5966; Melissa.parker@kp.org
O. Kenrik Duru, MD, MSHS2,
UCLA Internal Medicine Suite, 200 UCLA Medical Plaza, Suite 420, Los Angeles, CA 
90095-1685; tel: 310-794-8138; kduru@mednet.ucla.edu
Dean Schillinger, MD3,4,
Bldg 10, 3rd floor San Francisco General Hospital, 1001 Potrero Avenue, San Francisco CA 
94110; tel: 415-206-8940; dschillinger@medsfgh.ucsf.edu
Nancy E. Adler, PhD5,
Department of Psychiatry, Department of Pediatrics and Center for Health and Community, 
University of California, 3333 California Street, Suite 465, San Francisco, CA 94118; tel: 
415-4767759; Nancy.Adler@UCSF.edu
Howard H. Moffet, MPH1,
2000 Broadway, Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Division of Research, Oakland, CA 
94612; howard.h.moffet@kp.org; tel: 510-891-5902
Alyce S. Adams, PhD1,
2000 Broadway, Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Division of Research, Oakland, CA 
94612; alyce.s.adams@kp.org; tel: 510-891-5921
James Chan, Pharm.D, PhD6,
Pharmacy Outcomes Research; 1800 Harrison Street, Floor 13, Oakland, CA 94612; tel: 
510-625-3756; jim.chan@kp.org
Willam H. Herman, MD, MPH7, and
University of Michigan, 1000 Wall St, Ann Arbor, MI 48105; wherman@umich.edu; tel: 
734-763-1295
Julie A. Schmittdiel, PhD1
2000 Broadway, Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Division of Research, Oakland, CA 
94612; Julie.A.Schmittdiel@kp.org; tel: (510) 891-3872
Corresponding author: Andrew J. Karter; PhD; tel: 206-855-9551; andy.j.karter@kp.org. 
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
Health Serv Res. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 April 01.
Published in final edited form as:
Health Serv Res. 2015 April ; 50(2): 537–559. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.12223.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
1Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Division of Research, Oakland, CA
2David Geffen School of Medicine; Univ. of California, Los Angeles; Los Angeles, CA
3University of California San Francisco Center for Vulnerable Populations, San Francisco General 
Hospital
4University of California San Francisco Division of General Internal Medicine, San Francisco 
General Hospital
5University of California San Francisco Center for Health and Community
6Kaiser Permanente Northern Calif., Pharmacy Outcomes Research Group, Oakland, CA
7University of Michigan School of Medicine, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Objective—To assess the impact of a pharmacy benefit change on mail order pharmacy (MOP) 
uptake.
Data sources/study setting—Race-stratified, random sample of diabetes patients in an 
integrated healthcare delivery system.
Study Design—In this natural experiment, we studied the impact of a pharmacy benefit change 
that conditionally discounted medications if patients used MOP and prepaid 2 copayments. We 
compared MOP uptake among those exposed to the benefit change (n=2,442) and the reference 
group with no benefit change (n=8,148), and estimated differential MOP uptake across social 
strata using a difference-in-differences framework.
Data collection/extraction methods—Ascertained MOP uptake (initiation among previous 
non-users).
Principal findings—Thirty percent of patients started using MOP after receiving the benefit 
change vs. 9% uptake among the reference group (p<0.0001). After adjustment, there was a 26 
percentage point greater MOP uptake (benefit change effect). This benefit change effect was 
significantly smaller among patients with inadequate health literacy (15% less), limited English 
proficiency (14% less) and among Latinos and Asians (24% and 15% less compared to 
Caucasians).
Conclusions—Conditionally discounting medications delivered by MOP effectively stimulated 
MOP uptake overall while unintentionally widened previously existing social gaps in MOP use 
because it stimulated less MOP uptake in vulnerable populations.
Keywords
mail order pharmacy; pharmacy benefit designs; comparative effectiveness; health disparities; 
difference-in-differences; marginal structural model; inverse probability treatment weighting
INTRODUCTION
Mail order pharmacies (MOP) dispense medications by mail to the patient's home, offering 
convenience and eliminating access barriers (e.g., time, mobility, transportation), the 
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benefits of which may be compounded for patients using multiple medications.(Choudhry et 
al. 2011) Currently, one-third of all chronic disease prescriptions in the United States are 
dispensed by mail.(2005) We have previously demonstrated better adherence (Duru et al. 
2010), better LDL-C control(Schmittdiel et al. 2011), and no substantive safety 
concerns(Schmittdiel et al. 2013) among diabetic patients using MOP. Better adherence 
among those using MOP has been reported in other studies as well.(Devine, Vlahiotis, and 
Sundar 2010; Visaria 2012; Zhang et al. 2011)
Compared to walk-in pharmacies, MOP can also be cost-saving for the health plan, 
depending on differential wastage rates between the two delivery modes, the cost of 
increased drug utilization, and the size of any MOP incentives.(Carroll 2006; Carroll et al. 
2005; Devine et al. 2010; Valluri et al. 2007) The World Health Organization recommends 
seeking effective and low-cost, structural (system-level) approaches to improving adherence 
as an alternative to the frequently expensive, individual-level interventions.(Sabate 2003) 
Financial incentives for MOP may represent such a system-level approach if they increase 
the use of MOP and secondarily improve adherence and health outcomes.
However, structural changes can simultaneously improve population-level quality metrics, 
while also increasing social inequalities in health access and outcomes. We have previously 
reported lower use of MOP among minorities and those living in deprived neighborhoods.
(Duru et al. 2010) While MOP use has been increasing steadily over the past two decades,
(Carroll et al. 2005) underuse in vulnerable groups has been observed at Kaiser Permanente 
Northern California (KPNC) since MOP was introduced in 1999 (unpublished data). For 
example, in 2000, the prevalence of MOP use was 11% in Latinos, 12% in African 
Americans and Filipinos, 20% in Asians and 24% in Caucasians. A decade later, in 2010, 
MOP use grew considerably, but still lagged substantially in minorities: 37% in Latinos and 
African Americans, 46% in Filipinos, 63% in Asians and 65% in Caucasians. It is unknown 
whether and how financial incentives might impact disparities in MOP use.(Trinacty et al. 
2009)
We studied a natural experiment which included a pharmacy benefit change that increased 
cost-sharing, but promoted the use of MOP by discounting medications (i.e., reducing the 
increase in out-of-pocket costs) if patients prepaid 2 copayments and refilled using MOP. 
We evaluated: 1) the overall effect of rolling out the benefit change on subsequent uptake of 
MOP for dispensing of cardiometabolic medications among patients with diabetes, and 2) 
whether the rollout's effect on MOP uptake was uniform across social strata (defined by 
ethnicity, educational attainment, household income, English proficiency or health literacy).
METHODS
Setting
This study was conducted in KPNC, an integrated, health care delivery system that provides 
medical care to ~3 million members (~30% of the population of the catchment, with ethnic 
and socioeconomic distributions similar to the general population, although fewer very poor 
or rich members).(Gordon and Kaplan 1991)
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KPNC health plan pharmacy benefits are available only through KPNC's ~120 community 
pharmacies or, since 1999, via MOP. Although most new prescriptions are first dispensed at 
community pharmacies,(Valluri et al. 2007) KPNC patients may also fill new prescriptions 
by mail, with telephone access to a pharmacist who can answer medication-related questions 
after completing a simple enrollment process (by mail, phone or website). Unlike some 
MOP systems, KPNC patients must request (by mail, phone or website) each MOP 
dispensing and provide payment in advance (by credit card or check) before the medication 
is mailed (no automatic refills). Medications usually arrive within one week.
Intervention
Prior to January 1, 2006, the standard KPNC drug plan for all subjects required one 
copayment per dispensing (regardless of days’ supply or mode of delivery). Effective 
January 1, 2006, all individual Medicare Senior Advantage members and select commercial 
and employer groups were changed to a new, less generous drug benefit package (more cost-
sharing), which also included an incentive, in the form of a prepayment discount, to use 
MOP. The change in drug benefit was not a matter of individual choice, but rather based on 
employer group contracts. Impacted health plan members, which typically included more 
socially vulnerable subjects, were mailed an announcement describing the benefit changes 
and the MOP discount; originally in English only, translated versions of the announcement 
were available in the following year. The new benefit provided a 1, 2 or 3 months’ supply at 
community pharmacies at a charge of 1, 2, or 3 copayments, respectively. Alternatively, 
patients could use MOP and receive a one months’ supply for 1 copayment or use the 
prepaid discount which incentivized use of MOP by receiving 3-months’ supply for 2 
copayments (Figure 1). Thus a patient who was willing and able to prepay two copayments 
would receive a 100-day supply from the MOP compared with a 60-day supply from the 
walk-in pharmacy (i.e., 40 extra days’ supply for using MOP).
To illustrate, consider a scenario among patients whose benefits contract had stipulated a 
$10 copayment per dispensing (typically, a 3-month supply); that is, prior to the 01/01/2006 
benefit change, all patients would have been charged $10 for each dispensing of a standard 3 
month supply, regardless of whether they used a walk-in pharmacy or mail order pharmacy. 
Among those patients who had no change in benefits, that copayment remained unaltered 
after 01/01/2006. In contrast, patients who had a benefit change would now pay $10 for each 
one-month supply; however, they could get a better deal if they used the MOP and requested 
three one-month supplies. That is, patients with the benefit change who obtained their 
medications via walk-in pharmacy would pay $10 for each one-month supply. However, if 
they chose to use mail order pharmacy, they would pay $10 for each one month supply, or 
$20 for a three month supply. Thus, the mail order prepayment discount permitted them to 
pay one copayment less ($10 in this scenario) for a 3 month supply compared to using a 
walk-in pharmacy. Thus their cost share for a 3 month supply changed from $10 (before the 
change) to $30 for medications obtained via walk-in pharmacy or $20 for medications 
obtained via mail order pharmacy. Therefore, the prepayment discount to use MOP did not 
offset the increase in cost sharing for those switched to the new, less generous benefit.
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Participants
Study subjects were drawn from a cohort of 20,188 adults who were respondents (62% 
response rate) in the Diabetes Study of Northern California (DISTANCE) Survey, an 
ethnically stratified, random sample of diabetes members identified prior to January 1, 2005, 
(Moffet et al. 2008) The DISTANCE survey was offered in English, Spanish, Mandarin, 
Cantonese or Tagalog, and included a wide range of social factors that we hypothesized to 
be associated with social disparities in health care use and outcomes. To study the effect of 
the pharmacy benefit change among non-users of MOP, we limited the study population to 
diabetes patients not offered incentives to use MOP nor using MOP prior to baseline, and 
dispensed at least one of the cardiometabolic medication used as primary treatment for 
diabetes patients (anti-glycemic, anti-hypertensive or lipid-lowering). Thus, we excluded the 
5,216 subjects who used MOP during the 12 months prior to baseline (January 1, 2006); we 
also excluded 1,131 subjects not dispensed any cardiometabolic medication during the two 
years prior to baseline (January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2005) or during the year after 
baseline (January 1, 2006 – December 31, 2006), and 3,251 who either lacked continuous 
Kaiser membership or a standard pharmacy benefit contract throughout the observation 
window. This yielded an analytic sample of 10,590 subjects, of which 2,442 (23%) had a 
benefit change and 8,148 (77%) had no change, serving as the reference group.
Outcomes and follow-up
Initiation of MOP use (“uptake”) was defined as having at least one MOP dispensing for a 
cardiometabolic medication in the 12 months after baseline (among previous non-users). 
Our goal was to estimate the effect of the pharmacy benefit change on MOP uptake overall 
and across social groups defined by self-reported ethnicity, educational attainment, annual 
income, self-reported financial hardship (self-reported difficulties purchasing needed 
medications(Chien-Wen et al. 2002), medical supplies or food (Ross and Wu 1995) due to 
insufficient funds), limited English proficiency (always or often having problems speaking 
or reading English), and a validated measure of health literacy (problems understanding 
health education materials or instructions(Chew, Bradley, and Boyko 2004)).
Statistical Analysis
We used a difference-in-differences (DID) framework to study the impact of the benefit 
change on mail order uptake (“benefit change effect”). This benefit change effect was then 
contrasted (again using DID) across social groups by estimating the adjusted, absolute 
difference between the benefit change effect for any given social group and the reference 
social category (e.g., benefit change effects for African American minus benefit change 
effects for Caucasian); this estimate was called the “effect difference”. DID is a quasi-
experimental approach used to study change in an outcome before and after an intervention, 
after “netting out” the background change in rates due to effect of secular time trends and 
aging on that same outcome identified in a reference group who was not affected by the 
intervention.(Campbell and Stanley 1963; Meyer 1995) Regression to the mean is not a 
concern given both exposed and reference group have the identical starting point (none are 
MOP users at baseline). In the context of this study, the benefit change effect on mail order 
uptake was estimated by the uptake during the year following the benefit change after 
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subtracting the background secular time trends estimated by MOP uptake in those not 
experiencing the benefit change (reference group).
DID rests on the assumption that the unobservable (i.e., counterfactual) outcome in the 
exposed group, if they hadn't been exposed to the intervention, would be qualitatively 
similar to the observable outcome in the unexposed reference group. That is, if the group 
exposed to the changes in the benefits, had (counterfactually) not been exposed to those 
benefit changes, then we assume their MOP uptake would be similar to that observed in the 
reference group. We examined the validity of the DID assumption by evaluating the MOP 
uptake in 2005 (the year prior to the exposure) among subjects who had no MOP use as of 
01/01/2005, selecting the “soon-to-be-exposed” subjects who would receive the benefit 
change in 01/01/2006 and comparing them to the remaining subjects (i.e., no benefit change 
in 2006) who made up the reference group. The 2005 rates of uptake of MOP in these two 
groups prior to the implementation of the new benefit design were similar, although not 
identical. There was a modestly larger MOP uptake among those who would later receive a 
change in benefits vs. the reference group (1.38 vs. 1.04 percentage points per month, 
respectively). Although the 2005 population used for this test of assumptions was not 
identical to the population used for the final analysis (since we excluded those who started 
using MOP during 2005 prior to the 01/01/2006 baseline), the qualitatively similar uptake 
suggest that the DID assumption should be reasonable. While selection into groups receiving 
the different benefit packages could introduce bias the estimate of the benefit effect, this bias 
is assumed uniform across social groups and thus hould not impact the estimate of benefit 
effect differences across social groups in a substantive way. However, while we present the 
quantitative DID results below, we will interpret those findings strictly as qualitative given 
this is an evaluation of a natural experiment that rests on unobservable assumptions.
We addressed potential confounding from measured and unmeasured risk factors by using 
each treated group as its own control, comparing potentially confounding risk factors before 
versus after the benefit change use during our study, and by controlling for demographic and 
clinical differences between those with the benefit change versus the reference group. Those 
prevalent differences were accounted for using a marginal structural modeling (MSM) 
approach based on the counterfactual theory of causality.(Mortimer et al. 2005; Robins 
1999) The adjusted MSM models were weighted using a propensity score method called 
inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW). The IPTW were derived from a pooled 
logistic regression model (R2=77%): benefit change (yes/no) was regressed on baseline age, 
pharmacy copay for generic and brand medications, Medicare indicator, pharmacy benefit 
deductible indicator, pharmacy benefit business line (e.g., large employer group, small 
employer group, strategic group), ethnicity, income, education, limited English proficiency, 
inadequate health literacy or financial hardship). This weighting aligns the distribution in the 
comparison cohort of the variables used in the benefit change-probability model to match 
the distribution in the exposed group who experienced the benefits change. These estimates 
are unconfounded by the above adjustment variables under the assumption that the model is 
specified correctly. Models were further weighted to account for survey non-response 
(Horvitz and Source 1952) and the non-proportional sampling fractions (complex survey 
design). We estimated the adjusted, absolute benefit change effect (difference-in-
differences) by specifying modified Poisson regression(Zou 2004) with robust standard 
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errors and an identity link function.(Cheung 2007) Confidence intervals were estimated 
using bootstrapping. We also conducted sensitivity analysis after excluding the 6% (n=991) 
of patients whose expenditures exceeded that covered by Medicare Part D (i.e., those 
reaching the coverage limit or “doughnut hole”) during follow-up because financial 
incentives to use MOP would no longer be relevant while in the gap.
RESULTS
Subject Characteristics
The mean age of the subjects was 60 years, 50% were women, 80% minorities, 12% had 
limited English proficiency and 46% had inadequate health literacy (Table 1). Twenty-one 
percent had annual income <$25,000 and 38% self-reported difficulties paying for 
medications. Compared to the reference group, subjects who had a pharmacy benefit change 
had lower educational attainment, lower income, greater financial hardships, and more likely 
to have limited English proficiency, inadequate health literacy, and higher out of pocket 
costs for their cardiometabolic medications in the year prior to baseline. Prior to baseline, 
the average daily cost for medications in the benefit change versus reference groups was 
$0.23 versus $0.15, and the average out of pocket cost per dispensing was $13.65 versus 
$8.42, respectively. Thus, relative to patients in the reference group, those with the benefit 
change were already incurring more cost-sharing prior to the change. The majority of 
subjects were dispensed 3 month supplies at each fill before and after the roll-out of the 
benefit change. As expected with the introduction of a less generous cost sharing 
arrangement, the proportion dispensed 3 month supply at each fill dropped slightly (from 
85.5% before the benefit change to 83.1% after the benefit change) among those exposed to 
the benefit change. For the reference group, the proportion went up slightly during the pre- 
vs. post-period (from 88.4% to 90.7%).
MOP uptake and Benefit Change Effect
Among those who did not previously use MOP, 30% of diabetes patients with the pharmacy 
benefit change initiated use of MOP in the year after the benefit change, as compared to 9% 
of patients not receiving the benefit change (Table 2). The benefit change effect was 
quantified by the absolute difference in uptake between the benefit change and reference 
groups, which was a difference of 21 percentage points (95% CI: 19%-23%) in the crude 
model and 26 percentage points (CI: 22%-30%) in the adjusted model.
Vulnerable social groups had a substantially smaller MOP uptake overall and were less 
responsive to the discount. Among those with the benefit change, the benefit change effect 
was higher among those with adequate health literacy (35% percentage point greater uptake 
(95% CI: 27% - 42%) compared to those with inadequate health literacy (20% percentage 
point greater uptake (CI: 14%-26%), representing 15 percentage points (CI: 5%, 24%) effect 
difference. Similarly, the benefit change effect was 27% percentage point greater uptake 
(CI: 23%-32%) among English-speaking patients, while among those with limited English 
proficiency only 13% (CI: 6%-21%), representing a 14% (CI: 5%, 22%) point effect 
difference. There were also significant race-ethnic effect differences relative to Caucasians; 
Latinos and Asians had a 24% [CI: 14%-33%)] and 16% [(CI: 0.1%-30%)] smaller benefit 
Karter et al. Page 7
Health Serv Res. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 April 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
change effect. A smaller benefit change effect was also observed among those with lower 
annual income, self-reported financial hardship, and fewer years of education, albeit not 
statistically significant after adjustment. There were no substantive differences in our 
findings when re-running the above analyses after excluding the 991 members who lost Part 
D Medicare pharmacy coverage during the observation window, and in separate models for 
Medicare and non-Medicare subjects.
Sensitivity Analysis
To disentangle the effect of the financial incentive for MOP from a patient's choice of length 
of supply, we conducted a sub-analysis in the 8,860 patients who would benefit from the 
incentive because they consistently filled 3 month supply in the periods before and after the 
benefit change. The adjusted MOP uptake was 28 percentage points greater in those who 
received the benefit change compared to those with no change in benefit (33% vs. 9% 
uptake) (p<0.0001). Thus, restricting to people who could benefit from the incentive because 
they always filled a 3 month supply yielded essentially the same answer as the main analysis 
(which estimated a 26% increase in MOP uptake). We then repeated that sensitivity analysis 
in the 741 patients who would not benefit from the incentive because they consistently filled 
less than 3 month supply during pre- and post periods and detected no significant difference 
in uptake among those who did vs. did not receive the benefit change.
DISCUSSION
We examined MOP uptake after a pharmacy benefit change which included a prepayment 
discount for use of MOP, while offering a less generous (more cost-sharing) pharmacy 
benefit package. We observed a substantial stimulating effect on MOP uptake. In the year 
following the benefit change, the MOP uptake among previous MOP non-users offered the 
prepayment discount to use MOP was a 26% points greater compared to those not offered 
the discount. Given existing disparities in MOP use and the potential for MOP to improve 
convenience, medication adherence and risk factor control, it is important to understand the 
effects of benefit changes and incentives on vulnerable populations. In general, patients 
behaved as price-sensitive consumers and the discount greatly stimulated MOP uptake 
population-wide. However, the effect of the benefit change on MOP was substantially 
smaller among minorities, those with inadequate health literacy or limited English 
proficiency.
Since the introduction of MOP at KPNC in 1999, minorities have consistently lagged behind 
Caucasians in the uptake of MOP and the reduced minority response to the MOP discount 
perpetuated the disparities. Similar patterns were observed in a recent study reporting that 
minorities or patients with inadequate health literacy or lower educational attainment were 
less likely to initiate use of a widely offered internet-based patient portal even if they had 
access to a computer.(Sarkar et al. 2010, 2011) The disparities in MOP use may have 
downstream impacts on disparities in medication adherence and clinical outcomes. We have 
previously reported better adherence(Duru et al. 2010) and better LDL-C 
control(Schmittdiel et al. 2011) among diabetic patients using MOP. Better adherence 
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among those using MOP has been demonstrated in other studies(Devine et al. 2010; Visaria 
2012; Zhang et al. 2011), although one study(Khandelwal et al. 2011) had a null finding.
There are several possible explanations for these disparities in the effect of benefit changes. 
While one may expect greater price-sensitivity in vulnerable patients, the prepayment of the 
additional copayment required to receive the incentive was possibly more of a barrier for the 
vulnerable groups. The prepayment discount may have failed as an incentive if it was 
inadequately communicated to or understood by patients. We observed significantly lower 
uptake in those with inadequate health literacy, limited English proficiency, and among the 
two ethnic groups (Latinos and Asians) with the greatest number of non-English speaking 
patients compared to their respective reference groups (i.e., those with adequate health 
literacy and proficient in English, Caucasians). The reduced effect among patients with 
limited English proficiency is not unexpected. The health plan mailed a written notice of the 
benefit change (in English) to all the beneficiaries in advance of benefit design change, but 
did not distribute a Spanish-version of the notice until the year after the study. No other form 
of communication from the health plan was provided uniformly. We should expect that 
some patients would have additional information provided via discussion with the 
pharmacist when patients inquired about charges at the walk-in pharmacies. However, no 
subject-level data is available regarding those discussions.
The lower effect among those with inadequate health literacy may be attributable to 
difficulties navigating the complexities of the health system (i.e., understanding the steps 
needed to initiate a mail order refill); some patients may prefer the regular face-to-face 
interactions with pharmacists if they struggle with understanding written labels and 
medication instructions. Poor literacy is often accompanied by poor numeracy (i.e., the 
inability to understand and use numbers in daily life) which, though we did not asses this, 
may make it difficult for patients to weigh relative costs and benefits of the incentive.
(Cavanaugh et al. 2008; Rothman et al. 2008) Lower income individuals may lack a credit 
card and be unaware that MOP can be requested via a mail-in form with a check, or be 
concerned about using a telephone or internet for credit card transactions. Some patients 
may be concerned about having medications sent to a mailbox that may be vulnerable to 
theft.
The benefit change offered a prepayment discount for MOP such that patients had a larger 
initial, out-of-pocket cost to obtain the discount (“pay to play” design), representing a larger 
burden for vulnerable patients with limited financial resources, a barrier compounded for 
patients taking multiple medications. After the benefit change, those receiving the less 
generous benefit had a substantial increase in cost-sharing (e.g., $21.33 per refill paid by 
those receiving the new benefit vs. $8.78 in the reference group). Thus, the prepayment 
burden was increased by the greater cost-sharing. More price sensitive patients may simply 
have had insufficient discretionary money or liquidity and were limited by the two 
copayments needed to benefit discount offer, or simply preferred “money in hand” over 
future savings provided by the incentive.
While the majority of subjects were dispensed 3 month supplies at each fill before and after 
the roll-out of the benefit change, the change to a less generous cost sharing arrangement 
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also resulted in a slight decrease (2.4 percentage points) in the proportion dispensed 3 month 
supply at each fill (from 85.5% before the benefit change to 83.1% after the benefit change) 
among those exposed to the benefit change. Our sensitivity analysis suggests there was an 
incentive effect in members who were dispensed 3 month supply before and after the benefit 
roll-out. Among the remaining minority of subjects who filled less than a 3 month supply 
during pre- and post-periods, we detected no significant incentive effect; there was no 
significant difference in MOP uptake among those who did vs. did not receive the benefit 
change. This sensitivity analysis suggests that the offered incentive will likely not stimulate 
MOP uptake among patients whose usual level of dispensing is less than a 3 month supply. 
It is important to note that 80% to 90% of health plan members fill a 3 month supply at each 
dispensing and stand to benefit from the incentive.
Some limitations and strengths should be noted. This is a study of a non-randomized 
exposure (benefit changes), and although we used a rigorous causal modeling approach 
(DID framework with marginal structural models) to handle biases associated with 
observational studies, residual confounding by measured or unmeasured variables are still a 
threat to validity. To isolate the effect of the benefit change on MOP from expected secular 
changes in MOP, we netted out the MOP uptake among those who had no change in benefits 
(i.e., the reference group). A limitation of this analytic approach is that there is no way to 
prove the validity of the DID assumption that the MOP uptake in the reference group serves 
as a reasonable model for the unobservable “background rates” of MOP uptake in the 
exposed group if they were actually not exposed. Thus we exercise caution when 
interpreting the quantitative findings. Because we studied a cohort of non-users, there were 
no prior trends in uptake to guide our predictions of future changes in utilization. However, 
given the magnitude of the quantitative differences in MOP uptake (i.e., >3-fold greater 
MOP uptake in 2006 among those exposed to the new benefit vs. those not exposed) and the 
substantially smaller benefit-related uptake in socially vulnerable populations, we believe 
that the qualitative interpretation of our findings regarding the uptake that is above and 
beyond background is reasonable; the benefit change with a prepayment discount for MOP 
stimulated MOP uptake, but less so in vulnerable populations. The stark differences in MOP 
uptake in patients receiving the pharmacy benefit change (vs. not) will likely diminish over 
time with growing acceptance for this new mode of medication delivery and as the number 
of remaining non-users decreases. Because this is observational research, interpreting the 
social differences in the impact of the benefit change is complicated given the exposed and 
reference groups differed on baseline social characteristics, although the final models 
adjusted for observed confounders. The ideal reference group would have been patients who 
were switched to a pharmacy benefit offering a 1 month supply (rather than remaining on 
the 3 month supply plan) without MOP incentives. No such benefit structure existed. 
Concerns of endogeniety arise if subjects can choose which level of benefits they were 
exposed to. However, during the time of this study, while the generosity of benefit coverage 
varied across employer group or Medicare, patients receiving benefits through any one of 
these contractors did not have a choice of level of benefit plan. All but 3% (n=351) of our 
study subjects acquired health plan coverage via employment or Medicare and thus had no 
choice about the level of coverage. The adjusted model accounts for differences in the 
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generosity of benefits by weighting for pharmacy benefit deductibles and pharmacy benefit 
business line.
To simply report the MOP uptake in those experiencing the benefit change would 
overestimate the effect of the benefit change given the secular trends. We reduced that MOP 
uptake resulting from the benefit change by the background expected uptake observed in the 
reference group, after adjusting for case mix differences. That said, the variation in uptake 
among from different social groups receiving the benefit change (i.e., exposed) conveys the 
same take home message; vulnerable subjects receiving the incentive were less likely to 
initiate MOP. For example, among those who did not use MOP prior to the benefit change, 
44% of Caucasians vs. 21% of Latino and African Americans initiated MOP after receiving 
the benefit change. Although some of this MOP uptake would be expected due to secular 
trends and thus not due to the benefit change, the differential between social groups is 
consistent with a benefit change effect that differs is size across social strata.
The pharmacy benefit change combined the offer of a financial incentive, in the form of a 
prepayment discount, with a less generous pharmacy benefit plan. Those exposed to the 
benefit change were switched from a more generous baseline benefit to a much less 
generous benefit, and that may have impacted the magnitude of the incentive effect on MOP 
uptake. The financial incentive is the most plausible explanation for the increased MOP 
uptake. There is no obvious reason why charging patients more per pill (due to the increased 
cost sharing imposed by the benefit change) would induce the large increase in use of MOP 
that we observed overall or induce vulnerable patients to be less likely to take advantage of 
the MOP incentive that reduces the cost per pill. On the contrary, to the extent that 
vulnerable populations are more price-sensitive, they might be expected to be more likely to 
take advantage of the discount. Admittedly, we have no data available to explain why 
subjects made their choices regarding whether or not to initiate MOP. Substantive changes 
in adherence could change the motivation to use MOP or sample composition. One of the 
strengths of this study is that it was a natural experiment; the benefit change was not subject 
to patient choice or self-selection, but was dependent on group contract negotiations. 
Reverse causality is precluded also by the design's temporal ordering (i.e., pretest-posttest 
with controls) and regression to the mean is not a concern given both exposed and reference 
group have the identical starting point (none are MOP users at baseline).
This study suggests some policy-related lessons. Benefit change announcements using plain-
language in English and other languages should be sent out prior to initiating the change. 
When both modes of medication delivery are supported by a health delivery system, 
pharmacists and pharmacy staff could verbally encourage the use of MOP and explain any 
potential cost savings associated with the MOP to patients currently using community 
pharmacies. Rather than requiring prepayment of an extra copayment to receive the 
discount, a more uniform effect may be achievable by restructuring the discount so that 
patients using MOP receive a set number of free days’ supply for each copayment. “Pay to 
play” designs such as this may in the end act as a disincentive that overrides the benefit of 
any potential discounts for the patient in a way that differentially impacts vulnerable 
populations. While largely dictated by external forces (e.g., competitive health plan markets, 
group purchaser and federal insurer demands, rising cost of pharmaceuticals and provision 
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of health care), benefit changes present a difficult policy dilemma for healthcare delivery 
systems given the often competing economic and quality implications. In this case, the 
health plan benefit change simultaneously supported one quality improvement goals (e.g., 
increase use of MOP) and potentially reduced the cost of pharmacy operations, while 
competing with another (e.g., elimination of health disparities). These findings further 
demonstrate the hazard of assuming uniform effects of innovations, interventions or 
structural changes across patient groups. While we expect that inequalities in use of MOP 
will shrink as advantaged groups approach a ceiling and the disadvantaged groups catch up, 
the pattern needs to be viewed in the larger context. Even if the inequalities resulting from 
any given structural change eventually dissipate, the constant stream of new structural 
changes can perpetuate or exacerbate existing inequalities if even small and temporary 
differences in health system access are progressively introduced (see Phelan and Link's 
theory of “fundamental causes”(Phelan and Link 2005; Phelan et al. 2004)). To avoid 
increasing existing social differences in utilization, early testing for heterogeneity in 
treatment effectiveness provides an important opportunity to proactively design and tailor 
innovations, whether they be new benefit models, translation of interventions, or quality 
improvement efforts.(Frohlich and Potvin 2008; Varadhan et al. 2012)
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Figure 1. 
Impact of the January 1, 2006 benefit change for select patients on their cost sharing and 
duration of supply dispensed for patients obtaining their medications via walk-in vs. mail 
order pharmacy. Note that the copayment* per dispensing varies (typically from $5 to $15 
per copayment) and depends on the individual's contract.
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Table 1
Characteristics (unadjusted*) of the 10,590 KPNC patients who had not used mail order pharmacy prior to 
baseline date of pharmacy benefit change (1/1/2006)
Patient characteristics All (n=10,590) Pharmacy benefit change in 2006
Yes (n=2,442) No (n=8,148) p-value for unadjusted 
difference†
Demographics
Female 5,332 (50.4) 1,309 (53.6) 4,023 (49.4) 0.0002
Mean age (in years) (SD) 59.7 (10.1) 64.8 (10.1) 58.2 (9.6) < 0.0001
Race/ethnicity <0.0001
    African American 2,126 (20.1) 345 (14.1) 1,781 (21.9)
    Asian 1,101 (10.4) 284 (11.6) 817 (10.0)
    Caucasian 1,955 (18.5) 546 (22.4) 1,409 (17.3)
    Filipino 1,398 (13.2) 232 (9.5) 1,166 (14.3)
    Latino 2,053 (19.4) 618 (25.3) 1,435 (17.6)
    Multi-racial 1,164 (11.0) 251 (10.3) 913 (11.2)
    Other/unknown 793 (7.5) 166 (6.8) 627 (7.7)
Education < 0.0001
    No degree 1,839 (17.8) 694 (29.5) 1,145 (14.3)
    High school/GED 3,086 (30.0) 730 (31.0) 2,365 (29.5)
    Some college 2,613 (25.3) 503 (21.4) 2,110 (26.4)
    College graduate 2,808 (27.1) 427 (18.1) 2,381 (29.8)
Annual Income (in thousands) < 0.0001
    <$25K 1,891 (21.4) 906 (45.6) 985 (14.4)
    $25K-$49K 2,709 (30.6) 584 (29.4) 2,125 (31.0)
    $50K-$79K 2,176 (24.6) 278 (14.0) 1,898 (27.7)
    ≥$80K 2,074 (23.4) 219 (11.0) 1,855 (27.0)
Reported difficulties paying for medications 661 (7.9) 262 (14.0) 399 (6.2) < 0.0001
Reported difficulties paying for food 2,603 (26.7) 732 (32.8) 1,871 (24.8) < 0.0001
Reported difficulties paying for medical supplies 403 (5.7) 142 (9.2) 261 (4.8) < 0.0001
Any financial hardship (for food, Rx, or med supplies) 2,969 (38.4) 875 (49.1) 2,094 (35.2) < 0.0001
Limited English Proficiency 1,086 (12.3) 394 (19.8) 692 (10.1) < 0.0001
Inadequate health literacy 3,297 (46.3) 909 (57.7) 2,388 (43.1) < 0.0001
Mean home to local pharmacy distance in miles (SD) 6.5 (9.2) 7.0 (10.7) 6.4 (8.8) 0.005
*
n (%) unless otherwise specified; Column percentages shown
†p-value for Chi-square test for categorical variables and t-test for continuous variables
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Table 2
Out of pocket costs and utilization before and after pharmacy benefit change 10,590 KPNC patients who had 
not used mail order pharmacy prior to baseline date of pharmacy benefit change (1/1/2006)
Patient characteristics All (n=10,590) Pharmacy benefit change (before weighting)
Yes (n=2,442) No (n=8,148) p-value for 
unadjusted 
difference§
12 months prior to baseline†
Per day per medication cost‡, for community pharmacy fills, 
mean (SD)
$0.17 ($0.38) $0.23 (0.36) $0.15 ($0.38) < 0.0001
Total incurred cost per refill, for community fills, mean (SD) $9.62 ($8.53) $13.65 ($13.04) $8.42 ($6.11) < 0.0001
Days' supply dispensed, for community fills, mean (SD)) 89 (16) 87 (18) 89 (15) < 0.0001
1 month supply dispensed 784 (7.4) 251 (10.3) 533 (6.5) < 0.0001
2 months supply dispensed 347 (3.3) 69 (2.8) 278 (3.4) 0.15
3 months supply dispensed 9,293 (87.8) 2,087 (85.5) 7,206 (88.4) < 0.0001
Total dispensings, for community fills, mean (SD) 14.3 (7.8) 15.0 (7.8) 14.1 (7.8) < 0.0001
Cost-sharing 12 months after baseline†
Per day per medication cost‡, for community pharmacy fills, 
mean (SD)
$0.20 ($0.39) $0.35 ($0.48) $0.16 ($0.35) < 0.0001
Per day per medication cost‡, for mail order pharmacy fills, 
mean (SD)
$0.18 ($0.22) $0.28 ($0.26) $0.09 ($0.12) < 0.0001
Total incurred cost per refill, for community fills, mean (SD) $11.64 ($10.62) $21.33 ($15.27) $8.78 ($6.21) < 0.0001
Total incurred cost per refill, for mail order pharmacy fills, 
mean (SD)
$15.97 ($16.93) $24.23 ($18.26) $7.77 ($10.27) < 0.0001
Days supply dispensed, for:
Community pharmacy fills, mean (SD) 88 (16) 83 (20) 90 (15) < 0.0001
Mail order pharmacy fills, mean (SD) 91 (18) 95 (13) 87 (22) < 0.0001
1 month supply dispensed 801 (7.6) 336 (13.8) 465 (5.7) < 0.0001
2 months supply dispensed 246 (2.3) 48 (2.0) 198 (2.4) 0.18
3 months supply dispensed 9,417 (88.9) 2,030 (83.1) 7,387 (90.7) < 0.0001
Total dispensings, for:
Community pharmacy fills, mean (SD) 14.7 (8.1) 14.0 (8.8) 14.9 (7.9) < 0.0001
Mail order pharmacy fills, mean (SD) 5.6 (5.5) 8.0 (6.3) 3.2 (3.3) < 0.0001
Insurance Type
Part D group coverage (%) 1,454 (13.7) 22 (0.9) 1,432 (17.6) < 0.0001
Part D individual coverage (%) 1,814 (17.1) 1,817 (74.3) 0
Non-Medicare coverage (%) 7,322 (69.1) 606 (24.8) 6,716 (82.4)
*n (%) unless otherwise specified; Column percentages shown
†2005 vs 2006 used for pre-post comparison of those not receiving the benefit
‡
Per day medication cost equals the patient out-of-pocket cost divided by the days supply dispensed.
§p-value for Chi-square test for categorical variables and t-test for continuous variables
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 tim
e 
tr
en
ds
 a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
no
t a
ffe
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
be
ne
fit
 c
ha
ng
e).
 A
ll r
isk
 di
ffe
ren
ce
s i
n t
ab
le 
we
re 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
the
 <0
.05
 le
ve
l f
or 
H 0
: 
R
D
=0
;
† I
nd
ic
at
es
 st
at
ist
ic
al
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
≤ 
0.
05
 le
ve
l f
or
 H
0:
 R
D
(le
ve
l) =
 R
D
(re
fer
en
ce
)
‡ P
oi
ss
on
 m
od
el
 w
ith
 id
en
tit
y 
lin
k 
fu
nc
tio
n,
 m
od
el
s w
ei
gh
te
d 
fo
r i
nv
er
se
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 tr
ea
tm
en
t w
ei
gh
ts 
(IP
TW
), e
xp
an
sio
n w
eig
hts
 fo
r r
ac
e-s
tra
tif
ied
 sa
mp
lin
g d
esi
gn
, a
nd
 su
rve
y n
on
-re
sp
on
se 
(H
orv
itz
-
Th
om
ps
on
 w
ei
gh
tin
g).
 T
he
 IP
TW
 m
od
el 
inc
lud
ed
 ba
sel
ine
 ag
e, 
ou
t o
f p
oc
ke
t d
rug
 co
pa
y, 
be
ne
fit
s b
ase
d c
op
ay
 fo
r b
ran
d d
rug
s, 
M
ed
ica
re 
ind
ica
tor
, d
ed
uc
tib
le 
dru
g p
lan
 in
dic
ato
r, d
rug
 be
ne
fit
 bu
sin
ess
 lin
e 
(e.
g.,
 la
rge
 em
plo
ye
r g
rou
p, 
sm
all
 em
plo
ye
r g
rou
p, 
str
ate
gic
 gr
ou
p) 
an
d o
ur 
so
cio
ec
on
om
ic 
ind
ica
tor
s (
eth
nic
ity
, in
co
me
, e
du
ca
tio
n, 
lim
ite
d E
ng
lis
h p
rof
ici
en
cy
, in
ad
eq
ua
te 
he
alt
h l
ite
rac
y o
r f
ina
nc
ial
 
ha
rd
sh
ip
); 
we
igh
ts 
we
re 
tru
nc
ate
d a
t th
e 9
9th
 
pe
rc
en
til
e.
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 in
te
rv
al
s c
al
cu
la
te
d 
us
in
g 
1,
00
0 
bo
ot
str
ap
 sa
m
pl
es
 in
 th
e 
ad
jus
ted
 m
od
els
.
§ E
ffe
ct
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 is
 th
e 
ab
so
lu
te
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
ad
jus
ted
 be
ne
fit 
ch
an
ge
 ef
fec
t b
etw
een
 a 
giv
en
 so
cia
l s
tra
ta 
an
d t
he
 re
fer
en
ce 
soc
ial
 st
rat
a
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